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Abstract  Banks  can  avoid  bank  runs  and  panic  using  the  interbank  market  as  a  type  of  coin-
surance. Moreover,  because  of  the  possibility  of  losing  ﬁnancial  assets,  they  theoretically  have
incentives  to  monitor  their  peers,  borrowing  in  this  market.  This  paper  examines  whether  bank
risks are  explained  by  their  exposure  to  the  interbank  market.  The  market  discipline  hypothesis
suggests  that  bankers  are  well  equipped  to  monitor  their  peers,  and  the  interbank  borrowing  is
par excellence  an  uninsured  deposit.  Consequently,  banks  with  a  larger  exposure  to  the  inter-
bank market  should  present  strong  bank  fundamentals.  Using  a  sample  of  37  Mexican  banks,
from December  2008  to  September  2012,  and  dynamic  panel  models  based  on  the  SYS  GMM
estimator,  I  did  not  ﬁnd  evidence  in  favor  of  the  market  discipline  hypothesis.  These  results  are
robust to  different  indicators  of  bank  risk  and  exposure  to  interbank  markets.  This  is  a  wake-up
call for  policymakers,  who  should  restore  market  discipline  in  interbank  operations,  following
the disclosure  policy  in  Basel  III.
© 2015  Asociacio´n  Cuadernos  de  Economı´a.  Published  by  Elsevier  Espan˜a,  S.L.U.  All  rights
reserved.
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Disciplina  de
Exposición  al  mercado  interbancario  y  asunción  de  riesgo  en  los  bancos  mexicanos
Resumen  Los  bancos  pueden  evitar  las  huidas  y  el  pánico  utilizando  el  mercado  interban-
cario como  un  tipo  de  coseguro.  Además,  debido  a  la  posibilidad  de  perder  activos  ﬁnancieros,
teóricamente  tienen  incentivos  para  supervisar  a  sus  homólogos,  solicitando  préstamos  en  este
mercado. Este  artículo  examina  si  los  riesgos  bancarios  se  explican  mediante  su  exposición
al mercado  interbancario.  La  hipótesis  de  disciplina  de  mercado  sugiere  que  los  banquerosmercado; están bien  equipados  para  supervisar  a  sus  homólogos,  y  los  préstamos  interbancarios  son,  por
egurados.  Por  tanto,  los  bancos  con  una  mayor  exposición  al  mer-
resentar  sólidos  fundamentos  bancarios.  Utilizando  una  muestra  de
iciembre  de  2008  a  septiembre  de  2012,  y  modelos  dinámicos  conMercado
interbancario;
Riesgo  bancario;
excelencia,  depósitos  no  as
cado interbancario  deben  p
37 bancos  mexicanos,  de  dContagio;
México
datos de  panel,  basados  en  el  estimador  SYS  GMM,  no  se  encontró  una  evidencia  a  favor  de
la hipótesis  de  disciplina  de  mercado.  Estos  resultados  son  robustos  con  respecto  a  diferentes
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indicadores  de  riesgo  bancario  y  de  exposición  a  los  mercados  interbancarios.  Suponen  una  lla-
mada de  advertencia  para  los  legisladores,  quienes  deben  restaurar  la  disciplina  de  mercado  en
las operaciones  interbancarias,  como  continuación  de  la  política  de  divulgación  de  información
de Basilea  III.
©  2015  Asociacio´n  Cuadernos  de  Economı´a.  Publicado  por  Elsevier  Espan˜a,  S.L.U.  Todos  los
derechos reservados.
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l. Introduction
n  banking  markets,  economic  agents  should  respond  to  bank
isk-taking  because  their  costs  have  a  direct  relationship
ith  bank  risk.  This  response  is  known  as  the  market  dis-
ipline  hypothesis,  which  is  a  major  recommendation  in
asel  III  for  the  soundness  of  banking  systems  and  ﬁnancial
evelopment,  with  a  speciﬁc  relevance  in  times  of  the  ﬁnan-
ial  globalization  (Ayadi,  2013;  Basel  Committee  on  Banking
upervision,  2013;  Tovar-García,  2011a,b).
This  hypothesis  has  been  extensively  tested  in  the  sub-
rdinated  debt  market  (Evanoff  et  al.,  2011;  De  Mendonc¸a
nd  Villela  Loures,  2009;  Tovar-García,  in  press),  in  the
etail  deposit  market  (Tovar-García,  2014;  Berger  and  Turk-
riss,  2014),  and  even  in  the  loan  market  (Tovar-García,
012b;  Kim  et  al.,  2005).  The  major  ﬁndings  suggest  that
he  bank’s  creditors  discipline  their  banks  by  means  of  three
echanisms:  price,  quantity,  and  maturity.  For  instance,
epositors  request  higher  interest  rates  from  riskier  banks,
r  they  can  withdraw  their  deposits,  or  shift  their  ﬁnancial
ssets  from  long-  to  short-term.  These  reactions  have  been
onﬁrmed  in  Latin  American  countries,  for  Chile,  Argentina
nd  Mexico  during  the  90s  (Martinez-Peria  and  Schmukler,
001),  in  Venezuela  (Mun˜oz  et  al.,  2013),  in  Colombia
Márquez,  2011),  and  several  other  countries  in  different
eriods  (Tovar-García,  2014).
In  particular,  market  discipline  is  well  supported  by  unin-
ured  depositors,  and  interbank  borrowing  is  considered  par
xcellence  as  an  uninsured  deposit.  Accordingly,  this  market
hould  respond  strongly  to  excessive  bank  risk-taking.  How-
ver,  the  theory  is  ambiguous  and  the  empirical  evidence
n  market  discipline  in  interbank  markets  is  still  scarce.
iven  this,  the  present  research  is  motivated  by  the  fol-
owing  question:  do  banks  with  larger  exposure  to  interbank
arkets  show  lower  bank  risk?
If  the  answer  is  positive,  we  can  interpret  this  ﬁnding  as
vidence  for  discipline  in  the  interbank  market  induced  by
eers.  This  test  has  been  explored  in  Central  and  Eastern
uropean  countries  (Dinger  and  Von  Hagen,  2009;  Distinguin
t  al.,  2013)  and  in  the  Netherlands  (Liedorp  et  al.,  2010).
hus,  the  focus  of  this  research  is  on  the  bank  risk-exposure
exus.  Note  that  this  article  does  not  attempt  to  test  the
echanisms  of  market  discipline  in  the  interbank  market
price,  quantity,  and  maturity),  which  have  been  tested
n  USA  (Furﬁne,  2001;  King,  2008),  Portugal  (Cocco  et  al.,
009),  Italy  (Angelini  et  al.,  2009),  and  Russia  (Semenova
nd  Andrievskaya,  2012).
The  interbank  market  also  can  be  a  channel  to  trans-
it  risks  (Allen  and  Gale,  2000;  Freixas  et  al.,  2000).  In  the
f
b
lutch  case,  the  empirical  evidence  contradicts  the  market
iscipline  hypothesis  and  supports  the  contagion  hypothe-
is  (Liedorp  et  al.,  2010).  In  Latin  American  countries  the
arket  discipline  hypothesis  in  the  interbank  market  has
ot  been  tested.  Mexico  is  an  interesting  case  because  its
anking  system  has  been  expropriated  in  1982  due  to  the
ebt  crisis,  privatized  in  1991  and  bailed  out  in  1997  soon
fter  the  so-called  Tequila  crisis  in  1994--1995.  In  addition,
ecent  ﬁndings  suggest  a  weak  discipline  induced  by  Mexi-
an  depositors,  debt  holders,  and  borrowers  (Tovar-García,
012b,  2014,  in  press).
Consequently,  this  research  contributes  to  the  empirical
iterature  in  three  ways.  First,  this  is  the  ﬁrst  time  that  the
ank  risk-exposure  nexus  is  tested  in  Mexico.  Second,  it  uses
 large  range  of  dependent  and  independent  variables  to
heck  robustness.  Third,  it  employs  panel  data  in  a  dynamic
odel  with  a  SYS  GMM  estimator  (generalized  method  of
oments)  that  has  not  been  used  before  to  test  discipline
n  the  interbank  market.
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section
 reviews  the  literature  on  market  discipline  in  the  inter-
ank  market.  Section  3  describes  the  data  set,  a  sample
f  37  Mexican  banks  over  the  period  from  December  2008
o  September  2012.  Section  4  speciﬁes  econometric  models
nd  reports  and  discusses  the  results.  Finally,  conclusions,
ecommendations  and  proposals  for  future  research  are  out-
ined.
. Literature review
‘Bankers  are  especially  familiar  with  the  business  of
anking  and  therefore  have  a  comparative  advantage  in
etermining  whether  a  run  on  another  bank  was  called  for’’
Calomiris  and  Kahn,  1991: 773).  In  addition,  banks  have
ncentives  to  monitor  borrowers  (in  this  case  other  banks)
ecause  of  the  probability  of  losing  money.  Thanks  to  mon-
toring  activities  is  possible  to  minimize  losses,  and  the
nformed  bank  will  be  able  to  claim  debt  and  escape  ﬁrst
han  others  uninformed  bank  creditors.  Nevertheless,  inter-
ank  relationships  are  complex,  and  banks  can  avoid  bank
uns  and  panic  using  the  interbank  market  as  a  type  of  coin-
urance.  This  market  can  function  in  favor  of  cooperation
nd  coordination  in  the  payment  system,  especially  in  times
f  ﬁnancial  stress  (Calomiris  and  Kahn,  1996).
The  interbank  market  helps  banks  with  liquidity  prob-
ems,  borrowing  to  balance  its  payments,  and  usually  this  is
or  a  very  short-term  ﬁnancing.  Consequently,  the  lending
ank  can  quickly  escape  from  monitoring  tasks.  Neverthe-
ess,  in  modern  interbank  relationships  these  operations
nks  
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are  reiterated,  have  grown  considerably,  and  are  shifting
from  the  overnight  to  medium  and  long-term.  These  new
characteristics  motivate  peer  monitors  to  obtain  economic
information  with  a  larger  perspective  about  the  borrower’s
ﬁnancial  position.
Rochet  and  Tirole  (1996)  state  that  the  peer  monitoring
can  regulate  the  risky  behavior  of  the  borrowing  bank,  but  it
can  be  effective  only  under  correct  incentives:  the  lending
bank  must  feel  at  risk  and  must  be  formally  responsible  of
losses  due  to  its  decisions  in  banking  markets.  The  monetary
authority  must  not  rescue  each  bank  in  troubles,  sending
clear  signals  to  the  market.
Private  lenders  in  the  interbank  market  cannot  distin-
guish  solvent  banks  in  times  of  ﬁnancial  stress,  liquidity
shocks,  and  uncertain  about  techniques  and  judgments  on
risk-taking  by  peers.  Consequently,  the  government  inter-
vention  is  preferable,  yet  this  implies  that  the  government
intervention  (as  protection)  is  an  ampliﬁer  of  risk-taking  by
banks  (Flannery,  1996).
The  experience  suggests  that  the  ﬁnancial  sector  is  very
susceptible,  particularly  in  times  of  the  ﬁnancial  global-
ization,  and  a  small  shock  in  one  or  a  few  banks  is  able
to  spread  by  contagion  to  the  entire  economy,  in  one  or
several  countries,  negatively  impacting  the  processes  of
ﬁnancial  development  (Tovar-García,  2011a,b,  2012a).  The
interbank  market  is  clearly  a  channel  for  contagion.  Thus,
we  found  that  the  interbank  market  is  a  place  where  the
peer  monitoring  can  function,  but  also  this  market  is  a
channel  for  contagion  (Allen  and  Gale,  2000;  Freixas  et  al.,
2000).
Empirically,  the  literature  explores  whether  banks  with
more  exposure  to  the  interbank  market  have  lower  levels
of  bank  risk  (the  bank  risk-exposure  nexus).  The  baseline
model  to  test  this  nexus  can  be  written  as  (1):
Bank-Riskit =    EXPOSUREit−1 +  X ′it−1ˇ  +  uit (1)
where  the  dependent  variable  is  a  measure  of  bank  risk,
and  the  key  explanatory  variable  is  a  measure  of  the  indi-
vidual  bank  exposure  to  the  interbank  market,  principally
as  borrower.  X  represents  control  variables.  Dinger  and  Von
Hagen  (2009),  Distinguin  et  al.  (2013)  and  Liedorp  et  al.
(2010)  are  the  main  works  testing  the  bank  risk-exposure
nexus.
Dinger  and  Von  Hagen  (2009)  and  Distinguin  et  al.  (2013)
study  a  sample  of  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries,
they  ﬁnd  evidence  in  favor  of  the  market  discipline  hypoth-
esis  where  the  interbank  exposure  result  in  lower  risk  of
the  borrowing  banks.  On  the  contrary,  in  the  Dutch  case,
Liedorp  et  al.  (2010)  do  not  ﬁnd  evidence  in  favor  of  the  peer
monitoring  hypothesis.  Their  ﬁndings  suggest  that  larger
shares  of  both  interbank  lending  and  borrowing  increase  the
risk-taking  of  ﬁnancial  institutions,  supporting  the  contagion
hypothesis.1
Nier  and  Baumann  (2006)  examine  a  similar  relation-
ship  between  capital  buffers  and  interbank  deposits,  and
their  ﬁndings  indicate  that  a  larger  proportion  of  interbank
deposits  creates  incentives  for  banks  to  limit  their  risk  of
insolvency,  by  choosing  a  larger  capital  buffer  for  given  risk.
1 In this paper, I do not attempt to directly test the contagion
hypothesis.
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ther  scholars  study  the  mechanisms  of  market  discipline,
hether  riskier  banks  pay  higher  borrowing  interest  rates
nd/or  receive  less  credit  in  the  interbank  market.  In  USA,
he  empirical  evidence  suggest  that  high-quality  banks,  that
s,  with  higher  proﬁtability,  higher  capital  ratios,  and  fewer
ad  loan  problems,  pay  lower  interest  rates  when  they  bor-
ow  in  the  interbank  market,  and  riskier  banks  are  less
ikely  to  use  these  loans  as  a  source  of  liquidity  (Furﬁne,
001;  King,  2008).  Similar  ﬁndings  were  found  in  the  Por-
uguese  and  Italian  interbank  market  (Cocco  et  al.,  2009;
ngelini  et  al.,  2009).  In  Russia,  banks  with  higher  capi-
al  adequacy  ratios  enjoy  lower  interest  rates  (Semenova
nd  Andrievskaya,  2012).  These  are  related  concerns,  but
utside  of  the  limits  of  the  present  research.
.  Data and descriptive statistics
ollowing  Tovar-García  (2012b,  2014),  the  data  used  in  this
esearch  are  drawn  from  the  historical  statistics  of  the
ational  Banking  and  Securities  Commission  (known  by  its
panish  acronym,  CNBV),  covering  the  period  2000--2012.
lthough  CNBV  reports  monthly  statistics,  I use  quarterly
ata  due  to  the  quarterly  nature  of  the  bank  variables.
n  addition,  because  of  lack  of  information  for  several
anks  and  periods  I  analyze  only  37  banks  over  the  years
008--2012,  after  the  failure  of  Lehman  Brothers.  I  expect
hat  the  bankers  were  very  predisposed  to  monitor  bank
isk  during  these  crisis  years,  because  of  the  wake-up  call
Martinez-Peria  and  Schmukler,  2001).
.1.  Measures  of  bank  risk  and  interbank  exposure
 use  the  Z-SCORE,  as  dependent  variable,  to  test  the  bank
isk-exposure  nexus.  It  is  deﬁned  as  the  3-year  average  of
he  12  month  return  on  assets  (ROA)  plus  the  3-year  average
atio  capital  to  total  assets  (CAPITALR),  divided  by  the  3-year
tandard  deviation  of  ROA.  This  indicator  has  been  exten-
ively  employed  in  the  literature  to  capture  the  bank  risk  of
nsolvency,  and  to  test  the  market  discipline  hypothesis  in
he  interbank  market  (Distinguin  et  al.,  2013;  Liedorp  et  al.,
010).  A  higher  Z-SCORE  value  indicates  a  lower  probability
f  bank  failure,  that  is,  low-risk  bank.
In  addition,  as  measure  of  bank  risk,  I  employ  the  reserve
or  loan  losses  (RESERVE)  deﬁned  as  the  balance  at  quar-
er  end  of  provisions  for  possible  credit  losses  divided
y  nonperforming  loans.  A  higher  RESERVE  value  indicates
 lower  probability  of  bank  failure.  Similarly,  with  an
nverse  relationship  with  bank  risk,  I  employ  nonperform-
ng  loans  divided  by  total  loans  (DOUBTFUL).  Dinger  and
on  Hagen  (2009)  employ  similar  variables  to  measure  bank
isk.
The  key  explanatory  variable  of  bank  risk  is  the  partic-
pation  in  the  interbank  market,  as  a  lender  or  borrower.
 employ  four  variables  to  measure  this  participation.
irst,  the  ratio  of  interbank  lending  to  total  assets  (EXPO-
URE1).  Second,  the  ratio  of  interbank  borrowing  to  total
ssets  (EXPOSURE2).  Third,  the  ratio  of  interbank  borrow-
ng  to  total  deposits  (EXPOSURE3).  Finally,  the  ratio  of  net
nterbank  assets  (interbank  lending  minus  interbank  borrow-
ng)  to  total  assets  (EXPOSURE4).  In  the  former  variable,
160  E.D.  Tovar-García
Table  1  Descriptive  statistics  and  panel  unit  root  test  of  the  variables  for  Mexican  banks  (2008--2012).
Variable  Sample  37  banks  ADF-Fisher  2
Ho:  Unit  root
Obs  Mean  Std.  dev.  Min  Max  Statistic  p  (value)
Capitala 592  14,665.5  29,863.3  103.5  146,238.9  127.12  0.0001
Interbank borrowinga 586  5587.6  9486.9  0.0  67,123.2  194.10  0.0000
Interbank lendinga 592  4322.2  12,247.8  0.0  78,013.8  109.78  0.0044
Total assetsa 592  140,438.4  279,564.6  127.5  1,295,406.0  205.07  0.0000
Z-SCORE 588  27.9  22.6  −1.6  155.7  186.95  0.0000
RESERVE 484  803.9  4354.5  45.3  57,772.3  160.76  0.0000
DOUBTFUL 489  4.1  4.9  0.0  30.3  176.13  0.0000
EXPOSURE1 592  1.8  2.6  0.0 13.3  198.43  0.0000
EXPOSURE2 592  8.1  10.9  0.0 53.5  279.88 0.0000
EXPOSURE3 588  19.2  24.4  0.0  100.0  280.41  0.0000
EXPOSURE4 592  −6.3  10.9  −53.5  10.9  186.33  0.0000
CAPITALR 592  15.9  14.1  1.3  81.2  291.39  0.0000
ROA 590  −0.5  9.0  −83.9  19.8  138.92  0.0000
ROE 590  5.8  21.4  −131.3  66.6  91.32  0.0838
MANAGEMENT1  586  8.4  10.5  0.2  79.3  223.32  0.0000
MANAGEMENT2  571  102.3  142.0  10.7  1978.6  127.23  0.0001
LIQUIDITY1 591  11.2  9.3  0.1  65.9  238.47  0.0000
LIQUIDITY2 497  63.0  67.0  6.1  801.7  266.13  0.0000
Source:  Author’s calculations using CNBV data.
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ote  that  negative  values  indicate  that  the  bank  is  a  net
orrower.2
I  expect  that  banks  with  higher  exposure  to  the  interbank
arket,  especially  as  borrowers,  will  have  lower  levels  of
ank  risk.  Then,  higher  values  of  EXPOSURE1--3  and  lower
alues  of  EXPOSURE4  should  impact  positively  reducing  the
ank  risk-taking.
Former  studies  employed  measures  of  the  CAMEL  rating
ystem  (capital  adequacy,  asset  quality,  management,  earn-
ngs  and  liquidity)  to  control  the  effect  of  EXPOSURE.  It  is
orth  noting  that  the  CAMEL  indicators  frequently  are  used
o  capture  the  bank  risk  (Tovar-García,  2014).
In  this  research,  capital  adequacy  is  measured  with  the
atio  of  capital  to  total  assets  (CAPITALR).  For  asset  quality,
 use  the  reserve  for  loan  losses  (RESERVE)  and  nonper-
orming  loans  (DOUBTFUL).  For  management  quality,  the
atio  12  month  managerial  expenses  to  annual  average  total
ssets  (MANAGEMENT1)  and  the  ratio  12  month  managerial
xpenses  to  12  month  total  income  (MANAGEMENT2).  Earn-
ngs  are  captured  with  the  12  month  return  on  assets  (ROA)
nd  the  12  month  return  on  capital  (ROE).  For  liquidity,  I
se  the  ratio  short-term  (circulating)  assets  to  total  assets
LIQUIDITY1)  and  the  ratio  short-term  assets  to  short-term
iabilities  (LIQUIDITY2).
According  to  ﬁndings  in  previous  empirical  studies,  bank
ize  is  a  relevant  explanatory  variable.  Consequently,  I
pproach  the  size  effect  using  the  logarithm  of  total  assets
SIZE),  and  I  analyze  bank  subsamples.
2 Dinger and Von Hagen (2009), Liedorp et al. (2010) and Distinguin
t al. (2013) use similar variables.
t
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p
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Sariables are ratios in percent, excepting Z-SCORE.
.2.  Descriptive  statistics  and  subsamples  of  banks
he  summary  statistics  of  the  variables  can  be  seen  in
ables  1 and  2.  As  a  ﬁrst  step,  I  reviewed  the  data  to  elimi-
ate  outliers.  I use  four  subsamples  of  banks,  following  the
lassiﬁcation  of  Banxico,  as  Tovar-García  (2012b,  2014).  The
rst  subsample  includes  seven  of  the  largest  banks  (G7),
hich  usually  are  a  cutoff  point  in  the  reports  of  Banxico.
n  September  2012,  the  G7  operated  around  92%  of  inter-
ank  lending  and  around  62%  of  interbank  borrowing.  The
econd  subsample  includes  14  commercial  banks  with  typi-
al  activities,  but  smaller  than  the  G7.  The  third  subsample
ncludes  9  retail  banks,  which  specialize  in  transactions  with
onsumers.  Finally,  the  fourth  subsample  includes  seven
nvestment  banks,  working  on  the  issuance  of  securities.
Mexican  banks  present  a  large  dispersion  of  their  charac-
eristics,  according  to  the  standard  deviations  of  the  bank
ariables.  However,  this  dispersion  diminishes  considerably
n  the  bank  subsamples.  On  average,  the  seven  largest  banks
re  around  30  times  larger  (by  total  assets)  than  the  rest  of
anks,  and  these  differences  are  also  appreciable  in  terms
f  capital.
The  largest  proportion  of  interbank  lending  and  bor-
owing  correspond  to  the  G7,  on  average,  they  are  net
enders.  Conversely,  other  kinds  of  banks  are  net  borrowers,
specially  retail  banks,  as  can  be  observed  in  the  values  of
he  variable  EXPOSURE4.  The  interbank  deposits  are  more
elevant  for  investment  banks  than  for  the  rest  of  banks,  as
e  can  expect,  because  non-investment  banks  have  better
ositions  in  the  retail  deposit  market  (see  EXPOSURE3  in
able  2).  The  participation  as  lender  in  the  interbank  market
s  relevant  for  the  G7  and  commercial  banks  (see  EXPO-
URE1  in  Table  2),  and  the  participation  as  borrower  in  the
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Table  2  Descriptive  statistics  of  the  variables  for  Mexican  banks  by  subsamples  (2008--2012).
Variable  G7  Commercial  Retail  Investmenta
Mean  Std.  dev.  Mean  Std.  dev.  Mean  Std.  dev.  Mean  Std.  dev.
Capitalb 66,790.2  36,659.1  2451.9  2430.2  2085.9  1982.9  3141.6  2392.3
Interbank borrowingb 18,768.6  13,250.9  3445.1  4611.9  890.3  1494.8  2569.5  5747.1
Interbank lendingb 20,964.1  21,237.3  827.2  1063.3  21.5  75.2  199.6  395.3
Total assetsb 615,430.0  361,107.2  33,806.2  29,388.5  13,862.3  20,220.0  41,451.9  46,934.7
Z-SCORE 40.0  22.0  34.7  24.0  11.6  12.7  23.3  15.7
RESERVE 214.2  131.5  298.0  727.3  172.8  78.5  8806.9  14,872.2
DOUBTFUL 2.4  1.3  2.7  2.1  8.0  7.0  1.4  3.0
EXPOSURE1  3.4  2.3  2.6  3.1  0.3  0.7  0.5  0.8
EXPOSURE2  3.1  1.3  10.1  11.0  10.6  13.6  6.0  10.2
EXPOSURE3  5.6  2.3  18.5  17.9  22.2  31.1  30.6  31.0
EXPOSURE4  0.2  2.8  −7.5  10.1  −10.3  13.7  −5.5  10.3
CAPITALR 12.2  4.4  10.8  9.8  28.5  19.0  13.5  10.3
ROA 1.4  0.6  0.3  2.4  −4.5  17.4  0.9  1.4
ROE 11.9  5.7  8.1  9.6  −6.5  36.5  10.6  15.4
MANAGEMENT1  3.4  1.4  4.5  5.6  21.1  13.0  5.2  6.0
MANAGEMENT2  67.8  16.1  79.1  22.5  187.0  268.4  76.5  49.0
LIQUIDITY1 11.8  2.9  10.3  10.7  12.4  8.5  11.1  11.2
LIQUIDITY2 40.1  14.3  54.1  47.1  64.0  63.8  114.1  113.8
G7: Banamex, Banorte, BBVA Bancomer, HSBC, Inbursa, Santander, and Scotiabank.
Retail banks: American Express, Autoﬁn, Banco Azteca, Bancoppel, Compartamos, Banco Fácil, Banco Ahorro Famsa, Volkswagen Bank,
and Banco Wal-Mart.
Commercial banks: ABC Capital, Aﬁrme, Banco del Bajío, Banregio, Bansí, CIBanco, Interacciones, Inter Banco, Invex, Ixe, Banca Mifel,
Multiva, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Ufj, and Ve por Más.
Investment banks: Actinver, Bank of America, Deutsche Bank, ING, JP Morgan, Monex, and Royal Bank of Scotland.
Source: Author’s calculations using CNBV data.
a RESERVE and DOUBTFUL include only information of Monex and Royal Bank of Scotland.
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interbank  market  is  not  relevant  for  the  G7  in  comparison
to  other  types  of  banks  (see  EXPOSURE2  in  Table  2).
On  average,  Z-SCORE  (measure  of  bank  risk)  equals  27.9,
the  G7  and  commercial  banks  are  above  the  mean,  that  is,
they  are  banks  with  a  low-risk.  Conversely,  retail  and  invest-
ment  banks  are  below  the  mean,  as  we  can  expect,  because
of  the  nature  of  their  portfolios.  Investment  banks  show  bet-
ter  positions  in  the  variables  RESERVE  and  DOUBTFUL,  but
this  result  must  be  treated  with  caution  because  the  sam-
ple  include  only  two  investment  banks,  and  they  have  the
largest  values.
The  correlation  matrix  (see  Table  3)  shows  relevant  pos-
itive  relationships  among  total  assets,  capital,  and  the
amount  borrowed  in  the  interbank  market.  These  correla-
tions  are  in  line  with  previous  ﬁndings  about  the  relevance
of  the  largest  banks  in  the  interbank  transactions.  The
measures  of  exposure  to  the  interbank  market  show  high  cor-
relations  among  EXPOSURE2,  3  and  4,  as  might  be  expected,
but  they  show  a  low  correlation  with  EXPOSURE1,  that  is,  the
position  as  a  lender  in  the  interbank  market  has  a  low  corre-
lation  with  the  position  as  borrower.  The  CAMEL  indicators
present  some  high  correlations  among  them.  Subsequently,
in  the  regression  analysis  these  variables  are  included  with
prudence,  to  avoid  multicollinearity  concerns.  It  is  notewor-
thy  that  I  can  use  these  high  correlations  to  check  robustness
of  the  results  to  different  indicators  of  the  theoretical  varia-
bles.
p
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triables are ratios in percent, excepting Z-SCORE.
.  Empirical strategy
his  research  uses  regression  analysis,  as  previous  tests  on
arket  discipline.  Note  that  the  dependent  and  independent
ariables  might  face  endogeneity  concerns.  Therefore,  it  is
ecessary  to  use  instrumental  variables,  a  difﬁcult  task  due
o  data  limitations.  Furthermore,  we  are  analyzing  relations
ith  past  dependence,  that  is,  the  bank  risk  of  yesterday
an  be  a good  forecast  of  the  current  bank  risk.  Testing
he  asset  side  of  market  discipline,  Tovar-García  (2012b)
xploits  these  characteristics  among  dependent  and  inde-
endent  variables,  and  recommends  dynamic  panel  data
odels.
The  SYS  GMM  estimator  (Blundell  and  Bond,  1998)  allows
or  lagged  values  of  the  dependent  variable  to  be  entered  as
egressors,  and  it  uses  lags  of  independent  variables  in  ﬁrst
ifferences  and  in  levels  as  instrumental  variables  to  correct
ndogeneity.  It  is  assumed  that  the  error  term  is  not  serially
orrelated  and  Sargan’s  over-identiﬁcation  test  is  employed
o  validate  the  instruments.
King  (2008)  and  Semenova  and  Andrievskaya  (2012)  to
est  the  market  discipline  hypothesis  in  the  interbank  mar-
et  used  a  Heckman  correction  because  some  banks  do  not
articipate  in  the  interbank  market,  and  it  is  necessary  to
ontrol  for  real-zero  exposure.  A  Heckman  model  is  appro-
riate  for  markets  with  many  banks,  where  is  complicated
o  know  if  a  bank,  often  a  small  bank,  really  is  not  operating
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Table  3  Correlation  matrix  (pairwise).
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
Capital  (1)  1.00
Interbank  borrowing  (2)  0.79  1.00
Interbank  lending  (3)  0.84  0.64  1.00
Total assets  (4)  0.97  0.82  0.75  1.00
Z-SCORE  (5)  0.18  0.22  0.13  0.17  1.00
RESERVE (6) −0.07  −0.08  −0.05  −0.07  −0.06  1.00
DOUBTFUL (7) −0.20 −0.23 −0.21 −0.20  −0.30  −0.13  1.00
EXPOSURE1 (8) 0.33 0.27 0.47 0.26 0.08  −0.04  −0.30
EXPOSURE2 (9) −0.19 0.05 −0.14 −0.19 −0.08 0.01 0.08
EXPOSURE3  (10)  −0.22  −0.02  −0.17  −0.21  −0.17  0.05  0.15
EXPOSURE4 (11)  0.26  0.01  0.25  0.25  0.10  −0.02  −0.15
CAPITALR (12)  −0.13  −0.22  −0.10  −0.19  −0.17  0.00  0.34
ROA (13)  0.11  0.13  0.08  0.11  0.22  0.01  −0.47
ROE (14) 0.17 0.19 0.11 0.18  0.24  −0.04  −0.53
MANAGEMENT1  (15) −0.22 −0.26 −0.18 −0.23  −0.26  −0.05  0.46
MANAGEMENT2  (16) −0.12 −0.13 −0.08 −0.12  −0.18  0.00  0.37
LIQUIDITY1 (17) 0.01 −0.03 0.01 −0.01 −0.12  0.03  0.09
LIQUIDITY2 (18)  −0.17  −0.21  −0.12  −0.17  0.00  −0.05  −0.10
(8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)
EXPOSURE1  (8)  1.00
EXPOSURE2  (9)  0.14  1.00
EXPOSURE3  (10)  −0.09  0.71  1.00
EXPOSURE4  (11)  0.10  −0.97  −0.74  1.00
CAPITALR  (12)  −0.23  0.13  0.19  −0.18  1.00
ROA (13)  0.12  0.04  0.01  −0.01  −0.43  1.00
ROE (14)  0.14  −0.02  −0.03  0.06  −0.45  0.89  1.00
MANAGEMENT1  (15)  −0.29  0.10  0.12  −0.16  0.68  −0.44  −0.39
MANAGEMENT2  (16)  −0.13  0.12  0.09  −0.15  0.39  −0.74  −0.66
LIQUIDITY1 (17)  −0.03  −0.06  0.00  0.05  0.17  0.03  0.05
LIQUIDITY2 (18)  −0.11  −0.06  0.06  0.03  0.17  0.08  0.08
(15) (16)  (17)  (18)
MANAGEMENT1  (15)  1.00
MANAGEMENT2  (16)  0.51  1.00
LIQUIDITY1  (17)  0.25  0.02  1.00
LIQUIDITY2  (18)  0.04  −0.06  0.25  1.00
Source:  Author’s calculations using CNBV data.
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tn  the  interbank  market.  Certainly,  it  is  better  to  use  a  proxy
f  the  probability  of  exposure.
In  the  Mexican  case,  there  are  a  few  banks,  and  all  of
hem  are  usually  participating  in  the  interbank  market.  In
nterludes,  some  banks  do  not  borrow  or  lend  in  this  mar-
et,  but  we  can  trust  that  this  is  a  real-zero  exposure  for  a
peciﬁc  period.
.1.  The  bank  risk-exposure  nexusq.  (2)  is  used  to  test  the  bank  risk-exposure  nexus.  The
YS  GMM  method  is  alleviating  possible  endogeneity  con-
erns,  and  I  lag  the  explanatory  variables  by  one  quarter
nd  include  a  logarithmic  transformation  of  some  variables
b
i
i
qo  achieve  linearity  and  semi-elasticity  coefﬁcients.
ank-Riskit =  1 EXPOSURE1it−1 +  2 EXPOSURE2 −  4it−1
+  LnCAMEL′it−1 ˇ  +  1 SIZEit−1 +  BANK′t ˛
+  T ′t   +  uit (2)
Bank-Risk  can  be  Z-SCORE,  RESERVE  or  DOUBTFUL,  the
ey  explanatory  variable  is  EXPOSURE.  It  is  not  possible
o  enter  all  the  measures  of  exposure  at  the  same  time
ecause  of  collinearity.  Consequently,  I  include  EXPOSURE1
n  combination  with  EXPOSURE2,  3  or  4.  LnCAMEL  includes,
n  logarithms,  combinations  of  the  indicators  of  capital  ade-
uacy,  asset  quality,  management,  earnings  and  liquidity
nks  
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mExposure  to  interbank  market  and  risk-taking  by  Mexican  ba
(taking  into  account  collinearity  concerns  among  them).3
SIZE  is  controlling  bank  size  and  BANK  is  a  dummy  variable
for  each  type  of  bank  (G7,  commercial,  retail  and  invest-
ment),  where  the  G7  is  the  reference  group.  Thus,  the  model
controls  for  other  bank  characteristics  and  markets.  T  is  a
dummy  variable  for  years4 controlling  effects  of  unspeciﬁed
macroeconomic  and  ﬁnancial  market  conditions,  which  are
assumed  constant  across  banks.
The  fundamental  hypothesis  of  interest  is  that  bank  risk  is
lower  for  banks  with  a  higher  participation  in  the  interbank
market.  Z-SCORE  and  RESERVE  depend  positively  upon  the
level  of  EXPOSURE1--3  and  inversely  upon  the  level  of  EXPO-
SURE4,  considering  that  interbank  borrowing  is  the  major
channel  to  mitigate  the  risk-taking.  On  the  contrary,  DOUBT-
FUL  depends  inversely  upon  of  the  level  of  EXPOSURE1--3  and
positively  upon  the  level  of  EXPOSURE4.  This  is  interpreted
as  evidence  for  market  discipline  induced  by  other  banks  in
the  interbank  market.
Table  4  summarizes  the  main  results  when  the  measure
of  bank  risk  is  Z-SCORE.  In  columns,  there  are  results  of  the
regressions  using  the  full  sample  with  combinations  of  the
explanatory  variables  (consequently,  they  check  robustness
by  replacement).  The  explanatory  variables  are  in  rows  and
empty  cells  indicate  that  the  variable  was  dropped  because
of  collinearity.
It  is  noteworthy  that  the  dynamic  panel  is  justiﬁed
because  the  dependent  variables  as  regressors  show  statis-
tically  signiﬁcant  coefﬁcients  at  the  1%  level.  All  reported
estimations  pass  both  the  Sargan  and  the  ﬁrst  order
serial  correlation  tests  at  conventional  signiﬁcance  levels,
although  the  second  order  serial  correlation  test  shows  some
problems.
In  the  columns  (1)--(6),  only  the  indicator  of  exposure
as  lender  (EXPOSURE1)  shows  some  statistically  signiﬁcant
coefﬁcients  with  negative  signs.  Hence,  banks  with  more
exposure  to  the  interbank  market  as  lenders  present  higher
levels  of  risk.  Nevertheless,  this  result  must  be  treated
with  caution  because  other  regressions,  with  other  control
variables  (see  columns  1--3),  do  not  support  this  ﬁnding.
Moreover,  as  described  above,  in  the  section  on  descriptive
statistics,  the  largest  banks  are  net  lenders,  and  the  indi-
vidual  analysis  of  the  G7  banks  does  not  show  evidence  in
favor  of  this  ﬁnding,  as  will  be  discussed  below.
The  other  measures  of  exposure  to  the  interbank  mar-
ket  (as  borrower)  do  not  have  statistical  signiﬁcance  (see
columns  1--6).  Thus,  the  exposure  to  the  interbank  market  as
borrower  does  not  affect  the  levels  of  risk-taking,  and  these
ﬁrst  ﬁndings  do  not  support  the  peer  monitoring  hypothe-
sis.  Note  that  a  few  control  variables,  in  speciﬁc  the  CAMEL
indicators,  enter  signiﬁcantly  in  the  regressions.
The  number  of  banks  in  each  regression  diminishes
because  of  data  limitations  on  investment  banks  (see  row
N  ×  T  in  Table  4).  The  information  on  the  variables  RESERVE
and  DOUBTFUL  is  available  only  for  two  investment  banks.  As
a  result,  the  majority  of  investment  banks  are  not  included
in  the  regressions  (1)--(6).  I  removed  RESERVE  and  DOUBTFUL
as  control  variables,  to  include  these  banks  in  the  analysis,
3 ROA and ROE are not transformed in logarithms, because they
can have negative values.
4 With quarters the models showed collinearity problems.
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nd  the  new  results  are  reported  in  the  columns  (7)--(12)  in
able  4.  Now,  most  of  the  exposure  variables  (EXPOSURE2--4)
ave  statistically  signiﬁcant  coefﬁcients  with  the  predicted
ign,  in  favor  of  the  peer  monitoring  hypothesis.  Moreover,
he  control  variables  LIQUIDITY  and  MANAGEMENT  enter  sig-
iﬁcantly  in  the  majority  of  the  regressions.
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  in  most  of  the  regressions
ank  size  has  statistically  signiﬁcant  coefﬁcients  with  a  pos-
tive  sign,  so  larger  banks  show  lower  levels  of  risk.  The
ummies  for  year  2011  and  2012  have  positive  and  signiﬁcant
oefﬁcients  in  all  regressions,  as  it  was  expected,  because
-SCORE  has  a  positive  trend  in  the  last  years.
The  dummies  for  commercial  and  retail  banks  enter
ith  negative  and  statistically  signiﬁcant  coefﬁcients.  Sub-
equently,  these  types  of  banks  have  lower  levels  of  Z-SCORE
they  are  riskier)  in  comparison  with  the  G7  banks  (the  ref-
rence  group).  Besides,  this  indicates  that  the  regression
esults  depend  on  types  of  banks.  Accordingly,  I replicated
he  regressions  by  subsamples  of  banks.  Table  5  shows  the
ajor  ﬁndings.  The  problem  of  multicollinearity  among
ontrol  variables  is  higher,  but  different  combinations  of
ontrol  variables  showed  similar  results  to  those  reported
n  Table  5.5
The  regressions  by  subsamples  of  banks  do  not  present
vidence  in  favor  of  the  peer  monitoring  hypothesis.  All
eported  estimations  pass  the  Sargan  and  the  ﬁrst  and
econd  order  serial  correlation  tests,  yet  the  model  lost
eaning  for  the  G7  banks  and  investment  banks,  where  prac-
ically  nothing  is  explaining  the  levels  of  Z-SCORE.  In  the
ase  of  commercial  and  retail  banks,  only  the  dependent
ariable  as  regressor  has  statistical  signiﬁcance.
Consequently,  the  previous  ﬁndings  about  the  presence  of
arket  discipline  in  the  Mexican  interbank  market  are  not
obust.  The  statistical  signiﬁcance  of  the  bank  risk-exposure
exus  depends  on  the  inclusion  of  investment  banks.  With-
ut  these  banks,  as  reference,  the  rest  of  banks  do  not  show
vidence  in  favor  of  the  peer  monitoring  hypothesis.  Fur-
hermore,  the  exposure  to  the  interbank  market  by  types  of
anks  (subsamples)  does  not  present  a  signiﬁcant  relation-
hip  with  Z-SCORE  (bank  risk).
These  ﬁndings  also  imply  that  the  monitoring  activities,
f  they  exist,  works  from  one  region  (market  share  or  sector)
o  another,  as  described  by  Allen  and  Gale  (2000), probably
rom  the  G7  (net  lenders)  to  investment  banks.  I  do  not  ﬁnd
vidence  for  peer  monitoring  from  one  bank  to  other  bank
nside  of  their  banking  groups.  However,  it  is  worth  noting
hat  the  results  do  not  indicate  that  the  exposure  to  the
nterbank  market  increases  the  bank  risk.
Table  6  summarizes  the  main  results  when  the  bank  risk
s  approached  with  RESERVE.  In  columns,  there  are  results
f  the  regressions  using  the  full  sample  and  subsamples,  but
 excluded  the  subsample  of  investment  banks  because  of
ata  limitations  (RESERVE  is  available  only  for  two  invest-
ent  banks).  All  reported  estimations  pass  both  the  Sargan
nd  the  ﬁrst  and  second  order  serial  correlation  tests.Speciﬁcally,  the  dynamic  model  is  justiﬁed  for  the  full
ample  where  the  dependent  variable  as  regressor  enters
ith  statistically  signiﬁcant  coefﬁcients  at  the  1%  level  (see
5 These other regressions are not reported to save space. The
ame strategy was employed in all the regressions by subsamples.
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Table  4  Z-SCORE  --  exposure  nexus.
Pred  sign  Full  sample
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Lagged  dependent  0.72*** (0.04)  0.72*** (0.04)  0.68*** (0.02)  0.69*** (0.04)  0.67*** (0.05)  0.68*** (0.05)
EXPOSURE1 +  0.04  (0.38)  0.05  (0.39)  0.10  (0.35)  −0.74** (0.35)  −0.83** (0.38)  −0.71* (0.41)
EXPOSURE2 +  −0.01  (0.04)  0.09  (0.11)
EXPOSURE3 +  −0.01  (0.01)  0.05  (0.07)
EXPOSURE4 −  0.004  (0.04)  −0.10  (0.10)
CAPITALR 2.19  3.88  2.66  8.61** 9.60** 8.69**
RESERVE  −0.19  −0.10  −0.68
ROA 0.12  0.09  0.07
MANAGEMENT1  −2.67  −4.61  −1.76
LIQUIDITY1  3.43* 2.07  2.03
DOUBTFUL  −1.51  −1.64  −1.19
ROE 0.08  0.15  0.12
MANAGEMENT2 3.78  7.78  5.69
LIQUIDITY2 3.12  2.83  3.47
SIZE 2.03** 2.16* 2.59*** −0.15  −1.53  −0.92
Commercial banks  −10.56*** −11.34* −6.08  −29.47*** −31.92*** −30.32***
Retail  banks  −44.86*** −43.81*** −47.84*** −62.07** −93.59*** −81.36**
Investment  banks  −29.62  −32.55  28.41  −31.97  −43.38* −38.01
Year 2010  0.96  1.12  0.28  0.79  0.70  0.79
Year 2011  4.13*** 4.23*** 3.06*** 5.94*** 6.01*** 6.06***
Year  2012  2.44*** 2.41** 1.77* 4.56*** 4.96*** 4.88***
Period  December,  2008--September,  2012
Observations  447  447  447  399  399  399
N ×  T  32  ×  15  32  ×  15  32  ×  15  29  ×  15  29  ×  15  29  ×  15
Sargan test  (p-value)  18.72  (0.99)  20.23  (0.98)  17.53  (0.99)  17.34  (0.99)  17.33  (0.99)  17.16  (0.99)
First order  serial  correlation
test  (p-value)
1.49  (0.13)  1.47  (0.13)  1.86  (0.06)  1.21  (0.22)  1.10  (0.26)  1.11  (0.26)
Second order  serial
correlation  test  (p-value)
−1.79  (0.07)  −1.77  (0.07)  −1.80  (0.07)  −1.88  (0.06)  −1.78  (0.07)  −1.81  (0.07)
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Table  4  (Continuacio´n)
Pred  sign Full  sample  (including  investment  banks)
(7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)
Lagged  dependent 0.73*** (0.02) 0.73*** (0.02) 0.73*** (0.02) 0.71*** (0.03) 0.69*** (0.02) 0.71*** (0.03)
EXPOSURE1 +  −0.06  (0.14) −0.02  (0.14) −0.01  (0.14) −0.55* (0.29) −0.40* (0.21) −0.43  (0.30)
EXPOSURE2 +  0.05*** (0.01) 0.13** (0.06)
EXPOSURE3 +  0.01  (0.01) 0.08** (0.04)
EXPOSURE4 −  −0.05*** (0.01) −0.12* (0.06)
CAPITALR 3.14 3.02  3.14  5.41  8.01*** 5.42
RESERVE X X  X  X  X  X
ROA 0.02  −0.0005 0.02
MANAGEMENT1  −7.43*** −7.62*** −7.43***
LIQUIDITY1  1.32*** 1.42*** 1.32***
DOUBTFUL  X  X  X  X  X  X
ROE −0.04 −0.09 −0.04
MANAGEMENT2  −3.59 −6.11 −3.48
LIQUIDITY2 1.23** 1.41** 1.18**
SIZE  3.24*** 3.21*** 3.24*** 3.21  3.73*** 3.19
Commercial banks  −27.25*** −27.17*** −27.25*** −18.76** −17.47** −18.78**
Retail  banks −38.99*** −38.61*** −38.99*** −59.97* −54.60* −60.23*
Investment  banks −13.90 −13.56 −13.90 −10.44  −14.82  −10.43
Year 2010 0.17  0.22  0.17  0.18  0.15  0.20
Year 2011 2.30*** 2.29*** 2.30*** 4.73*** 4.79*** 4.74***
Year  2012 1.15* 1.15* 1.15* 3.08*** 2.98*** 3.07***
Period December,  2008--September,  2012
Observations  546  542  546  457  456  457
N ×  T 37  ×  15 37  ×  15 37  ×  15  33  ×  15  33  ×  15  33  ×  15
Sargan test  (p-value) 23.37  (0.96) 22.71  (0.96) 23.37  (0.96)  20.07  (0.98)  19.84  (0.99)  20.05  (0.98)
First order  serial  correlation
test  (p-value)
1.37  (0.16) 1.36  (0.17)  1.37  (0.16)  1.28  (0.19)  1.35  (0.17)  1304  (0.19)
Second order  serial
correlation  test  (p-value)
−1.70  (0.08) −1.71  (0.08) −1.70  (0.08)  −1.84  (0.06)  −1.74  (0.08)  −1.84  (0.06)
X: Variable excluded to allow the inclusion of more investment banks in the sample.
Regressions are estimated using the dynamic SYS GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998).
In parentheses are standard errors (only for the key explanatory variables and the dependent as regressor).
* indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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Table  5  Z-SCORE  --  exposure  nexus  by  subsamples  of  banks.
Pred  sign  G7  banks  Commercial  banks
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Lagged  dependent  −1.52  (1.89)  −1.11  (1.56)  −1.52  (1.89)  0.90*** (0.17)  0.95*** (0.18)  0.88*** (0.18)
EXPOSURE1 +  34.60  (29.07)  29.55  (24.98)  72.79  (60.23)  2.51  (3.60)  −1.09  (3.32)  2.36  (3.84)
EXPOSURE2 +  38.19  (31.29)  0.61  (0.43)
EXPOSURE3 +  18.49  (15.15)  −1.41  (1.43)
EXPOSURE4 −  −38.19  (31.29)  −0.60  (0.56)
CAPITALR −85.54  24.32  −78.60
RESERVE −0.55  0.49* −0.79
ROA −122.2  −144.1  −122.2  8.19  −11.28  6.70
MANAGEMENT1 106.05  −87.60  95.83
LIQUIDITY1 −12.93  26.76  −10.97
SIZE 10.1  13.2  10.1  −41.09  −20.05  −37.14
Year 2010  4.92  2.45  4.40
Year 2011  3.23  8.39* 3.23  2.43  19.32  2.04
Year 2012  36.46  37.86  36.46  4.19  2432.34  3.98
Period December,  2008--September,  2012
Observations  105  105  105  183  183  183
N ×  T  7  ×  15  7  ×  15  7  ×  15  14  ×  15  14  ×  15  14  ×  15
Sargan test  (p-value)  1.26e−22  (1.00)  1.06e−22  (1.00)  1.83e−21  (1.00)  3.23  (1.00)  1.53  (1.00)  3.34  (1.00)
First order  serial  correlation
test  (p-value)
−0.61  (0.53)  −0.62  (0.53)  −0.61  (0.53)  --  0.43  (0.66)  --
Second order  serial
correlation  test  (p-value)
1.15  (0.24)  0.94  (0.34)  1.15  (0.24)  −0.60  (0.54)  −0.41  (0.67)  −0.72  (0.46)
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Table  5  (Continuacio´n)
Pred  sign Retail  banks Investment  banks
(7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)
Lagged  dependent 1.45  (0.92) 1.39* (0.74) 1.46* (0.89) −0.11  (0.71) 0.17  (2.18) −0.11  (0.71)
EXPOSURE1 +  1.86  (7.09) −0.14  (13.25) 2.40  (5.30) −0.51  (5.02) −3.75  (50.86) 0.10  (3.77)
EXPOSURE2 +  0.16  (0.12) 0.61  (1.92)
EXPOSURE3  +  0.12  (0.16) −0.81* (0.47)
EXPOSURE4 −  −0.14  (0.36) −0.61  (1.92)
CAPITALR 1.84 −0.21 1.80
RESERVE −23.44
ROA 0.17  8.07  0.16  10.06  −6.74 10.06
MANAGEMENT1  −17.41 25.38  −18.00
LIQUIDITY1  2.09  −0.21 2.11  5.83  −3.92 5.83*
SIZE  3.09  −23.44 3.34  −3.55 −27.55 −3.55
Year 2010
Year  2011
Year  2012  −5.47  −3.42  −5.53  3.82  −878.47* 3.82
Period December,  2008--September,  2012
Observations  129  129  129  104  100  104
N ×  T  9  ×  15  9  ×  15  9  ×  15  7  ×  15  7  ×  15  7  ×  15
Sargan test  (p-value)  6.11e22  (1.00)  9.73e25  (1.00)  4.20e22  (1.00)  6.64e22  (1.00)  1.08e20  (1.00)  2.82e22  (1.00)
First order  serial  correlation
test  (p-value)
0.06  (0.95)  −0.08  (0.93)  0.06  (0.95)  −0.07  (0.94)  0.46  (0.64)  −0.07  (0.94)
Second order  serial
correlation  test  (p-value)
−0.01  (0.98)  0.34  (0.72)  −0.04  (0.96)  0.20  (0.83)  0.40  (0.68)  0.20  (0.83)
Regressions are estimated using the dynamic SYS GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998).
In parentheses are standard errors (only for the key explanatory variables and the dependent as regressor).
* indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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Table  6  RESERVE  --  exposure  nexus.
Pred  sign  Full  sample
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Lagged  dependent  0.54*** (0.04)  0.58*** (0.03)  0.54*** (0.04)  0.77*** (0.06)  0.74*** (0.08)  0.77*** (0.06)
EXPOSURE1 +  −0.01  (0.02)  −0.04*** (0.01)  −0.01  (0.02)  −0.07*** (0.02)  −0.05** (0.02)  −0.08*** (0.02)
EXPOSURE2 +  −0.01*** (0.002)  −0.01*** (0.001)
EXPOSURE3  +  −0.004*** (0.001)  −0.01*** (0.002)
EXPOSURE4 −  0.01*** (0.002)  0.01*** (0.001)
CAPITALR 0.33*** 0.30*** 0.33*** 0.38*** 0.37*** 0.38***
ROA  −0.02*** −0.02*** −0.02***
MANAGEMENT1  −0.47*** −0.35*** −0.47***
LIQUIDITY1  0.26*** 0.24*** 0.26***
ROE  −0.01** −0.01*** −0.01**
MANAGEMENT2  −0.08  −0.08  −0.08
LIQUIDITY2 −0.01  −0.02  −0.01
SIZE 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.09*** 0.08** 0.10* 0.08**
Commercial  banks  0.54  0.30  0.54  0.52* 0.26  0.52*
Retail  banks  1.80*** 1.83*** 1.80*** 0.03  0.23  0.03
Investment banks  2.53*** 2.34*** 2.53*** 0.92  1.09*** 0.92
Year 2010  −0.01  −0.01  −0.01  0.06*** 0.07*** 0.06***
Year  2011  0.04* 0.06*** 0.04* 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***
Year  2012  0.04  0.07*** 0.04  0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08***
Period  December,  2008--September,  2012
Observations  446  446  446  398  398  398
N ×  T  32  ×  15  32  ×  15  32  ×  15  29  ×  15  29  ×  15  29  ×  15
Sargan test  (p-value)  18.22  (0.99)  20.43  (0.98)  18.22  (0.99)  20.36  (0.98)  19.90  (0.99)  20.36  (0.98)
First order  serial  correlation
test  (p-value)
−1.30  (0.19)  −1.30  (0.19)  −1.30  (0.19)  −0.70  (0.48)  −0.53  (0.59)  −0.70  (0.48)
Second order  serial
correlation  test  (p-value)
−1.04  (0.29)  −1.04  (0.29)  −1.04  (0.29)  −0.69  (0.49)  −0.71  (0.47)  −0.69  (0.49)
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Table  6  (Continuacio´n)
Pred
sign
G7  banks Commercial  banks Retail  banks
(7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)
Lagged  dependent −1.74  (1.63) 0.63  (3.47) 1.89  (4.84) −2.91* (1.45) 0.14  (0.34) −2.91** (1.45) −0.61  (0.70) −0.46  (0.81) −0.56  (0.67)
EXPOSURE1 +  0.05  (0.07) −0.10  (0.75) −0.22  (0.87) 0.13  (0.10) −0.01  (0.04) 0.13  (0.10) 0.36  (0.69) 6.97  (8.43) 0.38  (0.70)
EXPOSURE2 +  −0.19  (0.20) −0.004  (0.01) 0.02  (0.03)
EXPOSURE3 +  0.09  (0.23) −0.01  (0.01) 0.06  (0.07)
EXPOSURE4 −  −0.01  (0.11) 0.004  (0.01) −0.03  (0.03)
CAPITALR 0.84** −1.42 1.52  −1.42 1.64  19.90  1.62
ROA −0.23 −1.12 −2.20 −0.44* −0.21 −0.44* −0.003 −0.81 −0.003
MANAGEMENT1 −5.16 0.48  −5.16 −0.35 −11.48 −0.36
LIQUIDITY1 0.64  −1.02 −3.14 −1.22* 0.82* −1.22* 0.44  5.17  0.44
ROE
MANAGEMENT2
LIQUIDITY2
SIZE −6.39  −1.58  1.70* −1.58  0.93  12.02  0.97
Commercial banks
Retail  banks
Investment  banks
Year  2010  −0.13  −0.07  −0.13
Year 2011  0.07  0.27  −0.26  0.27
Year 2012  −7.16  7.66  −0.10  0.57  −0.31  0.57  0.08  0.01  0.08
Period December,  2008--September,  2012
Observations  105  105  105  181  181  181  130  130  130
N ×  T  7  ×  15  7  ×  15  7  ×  15  14  ×  15  14  ×  15  14  ×  15  9  ×  15  9  ×  15  9  ×  15
Sargan test  (p-value)  7.69e26  (1.00)  1.50e24  (1.00)  8.60e22  (1.00)  2.90  (1.00)  3.18  (1.00)  2.90  (1.00)  1.85e24  (1.00)  4.84e21  (1.00)  4.42e25  (1.00)
First order  serial  correlation
test  (p-value)
0.59  (0.54)  −0.16  (0.87)  −0.39  (0.69)  0.52  (0.60)  −0.83  (0.40)  0.52  (0.60)  0.55  (0.57)  −0.08  (0.93)  0.52  (0.59)
Second order  serial
correlation  test  (p-value)
−0.65  (0.51)  --  −0.39  (0.69)  0.72  (0.46)  −0.17  (0.86)  0.72  (0.46)  −0.43  (0.66)  −0.53  (0.59)  −0.42  (0.67)
Regressions are estimated using the dynamic SYS GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998).
In parentheses are standard errors (only for the key explanatory variables and the dependent as regressor).
* indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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Table  7  DOUBTFUL  --  exposure  nexus.
Pred  sign  Full  sample
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Lagged  dependent  0.68*** (0.04)  0.68*** (0.05)  0.68*** (0.04)  0.61*** (0.05)  0.67*** (0.05)  0.61*** (0.05)
EXPOSURE1 −  0.02* (0.01)  0.03** (0.01)  0.03*** (0.01)  0.03  (0.03)  0.06*** (0.02)  0.03  (0.03)
EXPOSURE2 −  0.01*** (0.002)  0.02*** (0.002)
EXPOSURE3 −  0.01*** (0.001)  0.01*** (0.002)
EXPOSURE4 +  −0.01*** (0.002)  −0.02*** (0.002)
CAPITALR −0.23  −0.11  −0.23  −0.33*** −0.23*** −0.33***
ROA  0.02  0.03*** 0.02
MANAGEMENT1  0.36*** 0.36*** 0.36***
LIQUIDITY1  −0.21*** −0.20*** −0.21***
ROE  0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
MANAGEMENT2  0.41** 0.20  0.41**
LIQUIDITY2  −0.08** −0.06  −0.08**
SIZE  0.02  0.03  0.02  −0.03  0.02  −0.03
Commercial banks  0.66  0.23  0.66  −0.48  −0.93  −0.48
Retail banks  0.19  −0.41  0.19  −0.03  0.02  −0.03
Investment banks  −0.26  −0.70  −0.26  −1.17** −1.15* −1.17**
Year  2010  −0.02  −0.01  −0.02  −0.05  −0.09** −0.05
Year 2011  −0.11* −0.12  −0.11* −0.11* −0.19*** −0.11*
Year  2012  −0.15** −0.12* −0.15** −0.07  −0.20*** −0.07
Period December,  2008--September,  2012
Observations  451  451  451  398  398  398
N ×  T  32  ×  15  32  ×  15  32  ×  15  29  ×  15  29  ×  15  29  ×  15
Sargan test  (p-value)  16.25  (0.99)  15.78  (0.98)  16.25  (0.99)  16.59  (0.99)  19.08  (0.99)  16.59  (0.99)
First order  serial
correlation  test  (p-value)
−1.37  (0.17)  −1.25  (0.20)  −1.37  (0.17)  −0.80  (0.42)  −0.67  (0.50)  −0.80  (0.42)
Second order  serial
correlation  test  (p-value)
−1.25  (0.20)  −1.24  (0.21)  −1.25  (0.20)  −0.50  (0.61)  −0.54  (0.58)  −0.50  (0.61)
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Table  7  (Continuacio´n)
Pred
sign
G7  banks Commercial  banks Retail  banks
(7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)
Lagged  dependent 1.16  (1.57) 0.60  (1.30) 1.16  (1.57) 0.57  (0.47) 1.11  (0.78) 0.57  (0.47) 1.53  (2.30) −1.37  (2.54) 2.99  (6.52)
EXPOSURE1 −  0.03  (0.11) −0.01  (0.06) 0.12  (0.60) −0.06  (0.19) −0.05  (0.23) −0.04  (0.19) −0.03  (0.06) −0.12  (0.09) 0.18  (0.64)
EXPOSURE2 −  0.10  (0.50) 0.02  (0.02) 0.02  (0.04)
EXPOSURE3 −  −0.03  (0.03) 0.03  (0.02) 0.01  (0.02)
EXPOSURE4 +  −0.10  (0.50) −0.02  (0.02) −0.07  (0.19)
CAPITALR 0.38 −0.59 0.38  3.25  −3.80 13.02
ROA 0.59  −0.05 0.59  −0.20 0.10  −0.20 0.03  −0.11 0.09
MANAGEMENT1 1.39  4.92  1.39  2.77  0.73  2.35
LIQUIDITY1 2.58  0.89  2.58  −0.24 −0.17 −0.24 −0.11 0.87  −0.23
ROE
MANAGEMENT2
LIQUIDITY2
SIZE −0.33  −0.63  −0.33  2.07  1.67  2.76
Commercial banks
Retail  banks
Investment  banks
Year  2010  0.02  0.29  0.02
Year 2011  −13.54  3.58  −13.54  −0.48  −0.23  −0.48
Year 2012  −13.23  3.66  −13.23  −0.48  −0.16  −0.48  0.01  2.63  −0.10
Period December,  2008--September,  2012
Observations  105  105  105  186  186  186  130  130  130
N ×  T  7  ×  15  7  ×  15  7  ×  15  14  ×  15  14  ×  15  14  ×  15  9  ×  15  9  ×  15  9  ×  15
Sargan test  (p-value)  3.51e20  (1.00)  4.92e22  (1.00)  9.68e21  (1.00)  3.16  (1.00)  3.71  (1.00)  3.16  (1.00)  3.47e24  (1.00)  5.22e22  (1.00)  2.34e22  (1.00)
First order  serial
correlation  test  (p-value)
−0.09  (0.92)  −0.25  (0.79)  −0.09  (0.92)  −0.43  (0.66)  −0.17  (0.86)  −0.43  (0.66)  0.73  (0.46)  0.57  (0563)  0.41  (0.67)
Second order  serial
correlation  test  (p-value)
0.27  (0.78)  −0.21  (0.82)  0.27  (0.78)  −0.21  (0.82)  −0.50  (0.61)  −0.21  (0.82)  0.77  (0.43)  −0.13  (0.89)  0.36  (0.71)
Regressions are estimated using the dynamic SYS GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998).
In parentheses are standard errors (only for the key explanatory variables and the dependent as regressor).
* indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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olumns  1--6  in  Table  6).  In  this  case,  the  measures  of  expo-
ure  to  the  interbank  market  (as  lender  or  borrower),  in
eneral,  have  statistical  signiﬁcance,  yet  with  the  opposite
ign.  Banks  with  higher  exposure  to  the  interbank  market,
specially  as  borrower,  present  lower  levels  of  RESERVE,  so
hey  are  riskier.  This  is  evidence  against  the  peer  monitoring
ypothesis,  and  in  favor  of  the  contagion  hypothesis.
The  majority  of  the  control  variables  enter  in  the  model
ith  statistically  signiﬁcant  coefﬁcients,  I  will  not  comment
urther  on  that  to  save  space.  Nevertheless,  note  that
he  dummies  for  types  of  banks  show  some  signiﬁcant
oefﬁcients  with  positive  signs,  suggesting  a  bias  by  sub-
amples  of  banks,  as  in  the  previous  model.
Columns  (7)--(15)  in  Table  6  show  the  estimations  by  sub-
amples.  For  a  second  time,  the  EXPOSURE  variables  do  not
resent  signiﬁcance  in  any  case.  This  result  may  imply  that
he  channel  of  contagion,  if  it  appears,  is  from  one  region
o  another,  it  is  not  from  one  bank  to  another.  Anyway,  the
eer  monitoring  is  absent.
Table  7  summarizes  the  main  results  when  the  measure
f  bank  risk  is  DOUBTFUL.  All  reported  estimations  pass  both
he  Sargan  and  the  ﬁrst  and  second  order  serial  correla-
ion  tests.  I  expect  an  inverse  relationship  with  exposure  to
he  interbank  market  because  higher  values  of  DOUBTFUL
ndicate  riskier  banks.
The  results  are  similar  to  the  RESERVE  case.  The  full
ample  again  shows  evidence  in  opposition  to  the  peer  mon-
toring  hypothesis,  and  in  favor  of  the  contagion  hypothesis.
he  coefﬁcients  of  the  EXPOSURE  variables,  especially  as
orrower,  present  statistically  signiﬁcant  coefﬁcients  with
he  opposite  sign,  so  banks  with  larger  exposure  to  the
nterbank  market  are  riskier.  Once  more,  the  regressions
y  subsamples  of  banks  do  not  show  any  signiﬁcance,  and
he  subsample  of  investment  banks  was  excluded  because  of
ata  limitations  (DOUBTFUL  is  available  only  for  two  invest-
ent  banks).
Summarizing,  the  bank  risk-exposure  nexus  in  the
exican  interbank  market  rejects  the  peer  monitoring
ypothesis.  With  three  different  measures  of  bank  risk
he  regression  analysis  indirectly  suggest  evidence  in  favor
f  the  contagion  hypothesis,  because  banks  with  higher
xposure  to  the  interbank  market,  especially  as  borrower,
resent  higher  levels  of  risk  (lower  levels  of  RESERVE  and
igher  levels  of  DOUBTFUL).  It  is  important  to  note  that,  in
eneral,  the  regressions  by  subsamples  of  banks  do  not  show
tatistical  signiﬁcance,  and  this  ﬁnding  can  be  interpreted
s  connections  from  one  banking  sector  to  another.  These
esults  are  robust  to  different  combinations  of  explanatory
nd  control  variables.  In  particular,  the  regressions  with
XPOSURE2  and  EXPOSURE4  show  very  similar  coefﬁcients
or  the  independent  variables.
Although,  there  is  no  reason  to  assume  that  the  variables
ave  unit  roots  and  are  thus  non-stationary,  as  additional
obustness  checks,  I  also  estimated  the  equation  2  using
he  DIF  GMM  method,  which  has  a  better  control  on
on-stationary  variables  because  the  model  is  in  ﬁrst  dif-
erences.  The  results  are  very  similar  to  those  reported  in
ables  3--6.  In  addition,  I  replicated  the  regressions  using  as
ndependent  variable  the  ratio  of  the  indicator  of  exposure
o  the  corresponding  indicator  of  bank  risk  (the  ratio  of
xposure  to  risk-taking).  This  strategy  can  reduce  the
imultaneity  problem;  however,  the  regressions  presented
a
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utocorrelation  concerns,  yet  the  major  ﬁndings  are  similar
these  results  are  not  reported  in  tables  to  conserve  space).
. Conclusions
heoretically,  bankers  are  well  equipped  to  identify  low-
uality  banks,  and  banks  with  larger  exposure  to  the
nterbank  market  should  show  lower  bank  risk.  Previous
mpirical  studies  found  evidence  in  favor  of  this  bank  risk-
xposure  nexus  (Dinger  and  Von  Hagen,  2009;  Distinguin
t  al.,  2013).  Nevertheless,  the  interbank  market  also  is  a
hannel  for  contagion.
In  this  paper  I  studied  the  Mexican  case  over  the  period
rom  December  2008  to  September  2012,  using  regres-
ion  analysis  (dynamic  panel  models)  and  a  large  range  of
ependent  and  explanatory  variables  to  check  robustness,  I
id  not  ﬁnd  evidence  for  market  discipline.  On  the  contrary,
ome  ﬁndings  indirectly  suggest  that  the  interbank  market
an  facilitate  the  contagion,  similar  results  were  found  in
he  Dutch  case  (Liedorp  et  al.,  2010).
The  empirical  tests  on  the  bank  risk-exposure  nexus
emonstrate  that  Mexican  banks  with  larger  exposure  to  the
nterbank  market  show  larger  loan  losses.  In  other  words,
ower  levels  of  reserve  for  loan  losses  (RESERVE)  and  higher
evels  of  nonperforming  loans  (DOUBTFUL),  indicating  a
igher  probability  of  bank  failure.
When  the  measure  of  bank  risk  is  Z-SCORE  the  ﬁnd-
ngs  show  mixed  evidence.  Regressions  including  investment
anks  show  evidence  in  favor  of  the  market  discipline
ypothesis  where  banks  with  higher  exposure  to  the  inter-
ank  market  present  lower  bank  risk  (higher  values  of
-SCORE).  However,  the  regressions  do  not  show  evidence
or  market  discipline  by  peer  monitoring  without  the  inclu-
ion  of  investment  banks.  Moreover,  the  regressions  by
ubsamples  of  banks  (G7,  commercial,  retail  and  investment
anks)  lack  in  statistical  signiﬁcance,  which  indicates  that
nterbank  transactions  might  principally  be  from  one  bank-
ng  sector  to  another.  Therefore,  these  transactions  are  not
rom  one  bank  to  other  bank,  and  the  largest  banks  (G7)
unction  as  net  lenders.
These  ﬁndings  have  several  implications  for  Mexican  pol-
cymakers,  who  cannot  appeal  to  the  market  to  regulate  the
isky  behavior  of  banks  in  interbank  transactions.  Rochet  and
irole  (1996)  point  out  that  government  intervention  can
estroy  peer  monitoring  among  banks,  and  Distinguin  et  al.
2013)  empirically  found  that  regulatory  discipline  weakens
arket  discipline.  Therefore,  policymakers  must  develop  a
egulatory  framework  with  enough  accessible  information  to
conomic  agents,  who  must  feel  at  risk  due  to  their  decisions
n  the  banking  market.  Probably  Mexican  bankers,  especially
he  largest  banks  (G7),  which  are  net  lenders,  think  that
he  government  will  take  actions  in  accordance  with  the
nderstood  policies  too-big-to-fail  and  too-interconnected-
o-fail.
This  study  presents  data  limitations,  especially  for  invest-
ent  banks.  Therefore,  future  research  for  Mexico  must
ttempt  to  investigate  market  discipline  in  interbank  oper-
tions  including  in  the  sample  more  investment  banks.
lso,  further  research  is  required  to  examine  connections
mong  groups  of  Mexican  banks  (region  by  region)  to  iden-
ify  channels  and  probabilities  of  contagion,  that  is,  to  test
nks  
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directly  the  contagion  hypothesis.  In  addition,  classic  tests
on  the  mechanisms  of  market  discipline  (price,  quantity,  and
maturity)  are  necessary  for  a  deeper  analysis  of  the  peer
monitoring  hypothesis.
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